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Intangible property often is subject to probate adminis-
tration in several states because such property, having
no spatial existence, can be deemed to have its situs in
a number of jurisdictions. Where two or more states
administer the same property, conflict and confusion
exists, with resulting prejudice to all those concerned
with the estate. The author of this Note examines pres-
ent means of reducing these conflicts and explores the
possibility of limiting administration of each intangible
to a single state. She concludes that due process should
require that only one state have jurisdiction to admin-
ister each intangible and suggests that all intangibles
be administered by the decedent's domicile.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional foundation of jurisdiction to administer a
decedent's estate is similar to that of an in rem action.' This
concept that jurisdictional power over a res exists only in the
state where the res is situated is the theoretical basis of the pre-
vailing practice of ancillary administration of a non-resident de-
cedent's local assets. 2 Although the situs of a decedent's real or
tangible personal property is readily ascertainable, it is an
evanescent concept when applied to intangible property. Thus,
there is little to restrict a state from determining that an intangi-
ble is "within" its territory whenever it can show some degree
of power over the property. Although courts are often in agree-
ment as to the situs of a specific intangible for purposes of juris-
diction to administer, the fact that any choice is somewhat arbi-
trary has led to divergent results in some cases.
1. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (1900); ARiz. Rnv. STAT..N-. § 14-302
(1956); Ir. AxN. STAT. § 7-102 (1953). See generally Simes, The Adminis-
tration of Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding In Rem, 43 MicH. L. REv. 675,
676-87 (1945).
2. Overby v. Gordon, supra note 1. The requirement of ancillary adminis-
tration has its roots in the practice of the ecclesiastical courts. See Buchanan
& Myers, The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank
v. Maine, 48 HAav. L. REV. 911-15 (1935).
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The consequence of conflicting decisions on the situs of a given
intangible is that two or more states may assert exclusive juris-
diction to administer the same property. Apart from the obvious
disadvantages of confusion, delay, additional litigation, and in-
creased expense, multiple administration of the same intangible
property may result in the threat of double liability for the asset's
obligor. Furthermore, the possibility exists that several states
will reach conflicting results on succession to the same intangible.
Even where courts are in agreement on the situs of various in-
tangibles so that each is administered only once, needless ineffi-
ciency can result. To the extent that different types of intangible
property are deemed to be located in different states, ancillary
administration in each situs state normally will be required thus
promoting delay and increasing the expense of probate adminis-
tration.
Increasing interstate travel, coupled with a larger percentage
of decedents who held intangible property, will likely increase
the difficulties involved in administering intangible assets There-
fore, it is desirable to re-examine the standards which determine
the situs of intangibles for estate administration. This Note will
first examine the inadequacies of existing means of resolving the
difficulties engendered by conflicting claims to administer intangi-
bles and then will consider whether multiple administration of
the same intangible can be eliminated by establishing a uniform
situs for each intangible. Finally, the possibility of establishing
unitary administration of all intangibles by replacing ancillary
administration with a single administration at the decedent's
domicile will be developed.4
I. EXISTING MEANS OF REDUCING CONFLICT AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS
A. DEGREM OF UNIFOR-MnTY ON SITus
The possibility exists that two or more states will conclude
3. Cf. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657
(1959).
4. Various aspects of the issues herein considered are discussed in the
following: EHRNZWmG, CONFLICT OF LAws (1962); STUNIBER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (2d ed. 1951); Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purposes of
Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HAsv. L. REv. 905 (1918);
Hopkins, Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedents' Intangibles (pts.
1,2), 28 IowA L. REv. 422, 613 (1943); Morrill, Multi-State Estates, 103
TRusTs & ESTATES 734 (1964); Simmons, Conflict of Laws and Constitutional
Law in Respect to Intangibles, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 91 (1937); Stimson, Conflict
of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' Personal Property, 46 VA. L.
REv. 1345 (1960); Note, 30 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 224 (1956).
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that the situs of a decedent's stock, negotiable instruments, choses
in action, or other intangible personal property is within their
boundaries and will assert jurisdiction to administer the property.
However, multiple claims to probate jurisdiction over the same
asset are reduced by substantial uniformity in the decisions as to
the situs of particular intangibles. Thus, for purposes of adminis-
tration, the majority of cases hold that shares of stock are situ-
ated in the state of incorporation; 5 simple contract debts are
located at the debtor's domicile; a debt evidenced by an instru-
ment has its situs where the instrument is found;7 and insurance
payable to the estate is an asset wherever the insurer does busi-
ness.8 When two or more states which might assert jurisdiction
5. E.g., Albuquerque Natl Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 212 F.2d 943
(5th Cir. 1954); Nashville Trust Co. v. Cleage, 246 Ala. 513, 21 So. 2d 441
(1945); Harris v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 338 Ill. 245, 170 N.E. 285 (1930);
Nichol's Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 247 (1961); Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash.
72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912). Contra, In re Miller's Estate, 90 Kan. 819, 136
Pac. 255 (1913) (situs at domicile of decedent). See generally Annot., 72
A.L.R. 179 (1931). A Delaware statute provides that the situs of stock
of corporations which it has chartered shall be in that state. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1953). Despite the widespread adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code which im-
part negotiability to stock certificates, thus placing the situs wherever the
certificates are located, most cases adhere to the rule stated. Nichol's Estate,
24 Pa. D. & C.2d 247 (1961); See Hine, Situs of Shares Issued Under the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act, 87 U. PA. L. Rav. 700 (1939). ISTAT EM NT, CON-
FLICTs § 477 (1934) gives precedence to the administrator in possession of the
certificate. Where no certificates have been issued, the state of incorporation
can administer. Id. § 478. Nichol's Estate, supra, indicates that the state of
incorporation will relinquish jurisdiction where another state has begun ad-
ministration on the basis of the presence of the certificate.
6. E.g., Neely v. Havana Elec. Ry. Co., 136 Me. 352, 10 A.2d 358 (1940);
In the Matter of Estate of Atychides, 26 Misc. 2d 898, 203 N.Y.S.2d 677
(Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Will of Brauff, 247 N.C. 92, 100 S.E.2d 254 (1957). See
also Hopkins, supra note 4, at 430; Stimson, supra note 4, at 1387 nn. 238-41.
Bank deposits have been analogized to the debtor-creditor relationship and
are subject to administration where the bank is located. See In re Estate of
Kane, 30 Ill. App. 2d 470, 175 N.E.2d 290 (1961); Gregory v. Lansing, 115
Minn. 73, 131 N.W. 1010 (1911).
7. E.g., Flath v. Neal, 63 Ariz. 68, 159 P.2d 617 (1945); Estate of Glass-
ford, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 249 P.2d (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Michigan Trust
Co. v. Chaffee, 73 N.D. 86, 11 N.W2d 108 (1943). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS
§§ 476, 479 (1934) adopts this mercantile view and recognizes only the ad-
ministrator who has possession of the instrument. Cf. ILL. R V. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 55 (1963). See generally Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of
Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 489 (1953); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 485, 488 (1933).
8. New England Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 (1884). In cases
where a nonresident has been killed in an automobile accident within the
forum, some courts have held that potential indemnification under a liability
insurance policy issued by a company doing business within the state is an
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over a particular intangible acknowledge the same situs, multiple
administration of the same property is eliminated, an obligor is
free from the threat of double liability,9 and succession to that
particular intangible is determined by only one state.
Nonetheless, there is less than complete agreement on the situs
of intangibles for purposes of probate jurisdiction. For example,
one state occasionally will seek to administer corporate stock
based on the presence of the certificates while another state claims
jurisdiction because it is the state of incorporation.'0 Further,
even when states are agreed in abstract terms on the situs of a
particular type of intangible, conflicts may occur as a result of
incompatible characterization by two states of an intangible
asset. One state might characterize an obligation as a contract
debt and place the situs at the debtor's domicile while another
state might determine that the same obligation is evidenced by
an instrument whose location determines the situs. n1 Moreover,
even though situs of specific intangibles may be agreed on, since
this situs may be different for each of the decedent's intangibles,
administration of these assets will be scattered among several
states, thus preventing the economy and efficiency of unitary
administration.
B. COWTY
Although the full faith and credit clause presently is ineffectual
in solving jurisdictional disputes in the administration of intangi-
bles,'" the principle of comity does have an ameliorating influence.
asset which gives jurisdiction to appoint an administrator. The practical effect
of such decisions is to provide a defendant who can be sued in a forum con-
venient for a resident plaintiff. See, e.g., Tweed v. Houghton, 103 Ga. App.
57, 118 S.E.2d 496 (1961); In re Riggle's Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.ad
436 (1962); In re Breese's Estate, 51 Wash. 2d 302, 317 P.d 1055 (1957); cf.
In re Wait's Estate, 23 Cal. 2d 676, 146 P.2d 5 (1944). Contra, Wheat v. Fi-
delity & Cas. Co. of New York, 128 Colo. 236, 261 P.2d 493 (1953) (dicta); In
re Roger's Estate, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P.2d 857 (1948).
9. But see Carr v. Prudential Ins. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y. City Ct.
1940), in which an insurance company paid the ancillary administrator. While
recognizing that life insurance payable to the estate is an asset wherever the
company does business, the domiciliary state refused to recognize payment
to the ancillary administrator absent a shoeing that the company was un-
aware of the domiciliary administration.
10. See, e.g., Albuquerque Natl Bank v. Citizens Natl Bank, 212 F.d
943 (5th Cir. 1954).
11. Disputes may even arise as to whether the property is tangible or in-
tangible. See Thomas v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 443 (1960), 46 M1Xm. L. REv. 893
(1961).
12. Where the first forum did not have jurisdiction because no property
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On the basis of comity, a second state with potential jurisdiction
over an intangible often acquiesces to the state first assuming
jurisdiction. 3 For example, in Lohman v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
14
the decedent's New York administrator had possession of stock
certificates of a Missouri corporation. In a New York action, 15
the Missouri administrator contended that he was entitled to
administer the stock since the corporation's domicile was Mis-
souri. He was unsuccessful in that action and sought relief in the
Missouri courts. Acknowledging that the full faith and credit
clause did not require recognition of New York's jurisdiction, the
Missouri court nonetheless declined to assert jurisdiction on be-
half of the Missouri administrator. Resting its decision on the
principle of comity, the Missouri court acquiesced in New York's
prior assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of the
certificates. The court pointed out that there was no need to
insist upon jurisdiction in the absence of Missouri creditors or
other persons interested in the estate - thus emphasizing a weak-
ness inherent in comity as a means of avoiding multiple adminis-
tration. Since its application is only a matter of grace, a court
may disregard the principle where local interests will be served
by the exercise of jurisdiction. Further, comity safely may be
relied on only at the conclusion of two lawsuits- one in which
one forum takes jurisdiction and another in which a second forum
accedes to the jurisdiction of the first. Even then, a third state
may claim jurisdiction.
C. SUBSTANTIAL UNIORMTY ON CHoIcE oF LAw
One of the problems created by multiple administration of
intangibles is the possibility of conflicting decisions on succession
was in the state, the full faith and credit clause does not require the second
forum to recognize the judgment or decree; the latter is not bound by the
former's assertion of jurisdiction but may inquire whether that court met the
jurisdictional standards imposed by the United States Constitution. Riley v.
New York Trust Co., 815 U.S. 343 (1942); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59
(1938); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873); EHMENzwEiG,
CONFLICT or LAws §§ 57, 58 (1959); RESTATEmENT, CoNFLIcTS § 429 com-
ment (e), (g) (1984). However, if a constitutional standard were developed
for determining in which state an intangible is located, the second forum
could not refuse to acquiesce to the first state's assertion of jurisdiction,
provided it met the constitutional standard. See text accompanying notes
43-46 infra.
13. See, e.g., Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456,
466 (1939); Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 212 F.2d 943,
949 (5th Cir. 1954); Nichol's Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 247 (1961).
14. 326 Mlo. 868, 33 S.W.2d 117 (1930).
15. Norrie v. Kansas City So. Ry., 7 F.2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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to the asset." This problem is mitigated by the choice of law
rule, adhered to by most jurisdictions, which looks to the law
of the decedent's last domicile to determine succession to personal
property.' 7 Moreover, a determination by the domicile that a will
is valid is generally recognized by other states, so that normally
there will be no dispute as to whether distribution should be
testamentary or by intestate succession.' 8 However, this choice
of law rule comes into play only after a court has assumed juris-
diction. It has no utility for determining which state should have
jurisdiction to administer an intangible. Thus the possibility of
multiple administration of the same intangible and/or of the
intangible assets of the estate as a whole exists despite this rule.
11. PROPOSED METHODS OF ELIMINATING
CONFLICT
A. SINGLE SITUS FOR EACH INTANGIBTE
1. State Legislative Action
Multiple administration of the same intangible and the unde-
sirable consequences it fosters could be eliminated if each type
of intangible property were accorded a single and exclusive situs.
The long standing rule which requires property to be admin-
istered in the state where located has necessitated assigning a
judicially created situs to various types of intangibles. The fact
that intangible property has no spatial existence, and the fact
that different conclusions have been reached on the situs of cer-
tain intangibles does not preclude establishment of a definitive
and exclusive situs for each type of intangible. Individually, the
states do not have power to impose a uniform situs upon each
other, unless by reciprocal legislation. Presently at least two
states have enacted statutes which set forth the situs of desig-
nated intangible property for purposes of administration. 9 If all
16. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
17. See, e.g., Niles v. Niles, 35 Del. Ch. 106, 111 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1955); Mar-
tin v. Harris, 305 Ky. 235, 203 S.W.2d 78 (1947); In re Sherman's Will, 71
N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1947); ATKINsoN, Wn s § 94 (2d ed. 1953); RSTATE-
MENT, CONFLICTS § 306 (1934). For a collection of statutes which have em-
braced the common law rule, see Rees, Awricam Wills Statutes (pts. 1, 2), 46
VA. L. REv. 613, 856 (1960).
18. See, e.g., Estate of Brace, 180 Cal. App. 2d 797, 4 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960). See generally EERPNZWEIG, CONFLICT op LAWS § 52 n.18
(1959); Bozeman, The Conflict of Laws Relating to Wills, Probate Decrees
and Estates, 49 A.B.AJ. 670 (1963).
19. IL. Rav. STAT. ch. 3, § 55 (1963); Mo. RPv. STAT. § 473.671 (1959).
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states were to adopt identical statutes, conflicting claims to ad-
minister intangibles would be substantially reduced2
2. Federal Constitutional Mandate
In the absence of state legislation, the possibility of judicial
establishment of a uniform situs for each intangible by constitu-
tional mandate may be considered. Several Supreme Court deci-
sions have incidentally ruled upon the situs of various intangibles.
In Wyman v. Halstead21 the District of Columbia ancillary ad-
ministrator of an Alabama domiciliary secured a writ of man-
damus compelling the United States Treasurer to pay him a debt
due the estate. The Treasurer refused to pay, contending that
only the domiciliary representative could compel payment. The
Supreme Court dissolved the writ, holding that the Treasurer
could, at his discretion, pay either administrator and had not
abused the discretion by refusing to pay the ancillary adminis-
trator. Citing several state cases, the Court indicated in dictum
that in cases not involving the United States simple contract
debts have their situs at the debtor's domicile for purposes of
founding administration,2 regardless of where the paper evidence
is located. In Iowa v. Slimmera however, the Court indicated
that debts evidenced by an instrument are subject to ancillary
administration wherever the instrument is located. In Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co.,24 the Court stated that "the State which has
created a corporation has such control over the transfer of its
shares of stock that it may administer upon the shares of a de-
ceased owner . "..."25
However, all of the foregoing decisions seem to be merely in-
clusionary rather than exclusionary in establishing jurisdiction.
In none of these cases did the Court intimate that jurisdiction to
administer is limited to the state whose power was sustained by
the decision. Indeed, the decision in New England Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Woodworth"6 leads to the possibility that several states
may assert jurisdiction over the same asset. In that case the
20. See note 37 infra. Of course, conflicts would remain to the extent that
the various state courts would apply different provisions of their identical
statutes by characterizing a given intangible differently.
21. 109 U.S. 654 (1884).
22. Compare In re Noyes' Estate, 182 Ore. 1, 185 P.2d 555 (1947) (Salary
owed by United States to deceased serviceman has situs at his domicile).
28. 248 U.S. 115 (1918).
24. 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
25. Id. at 401.
26. 111 U.S. 188 (1884).
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Court declined to restrict administration of a life insurance policy
to the decedent's domicile or to the company's principal place
of business and held that life insurance payable to the estate is
an asset in any state where the company does business and has
an agent for service of process.
2 7
On the other hand, the Court in none of these cases considered
whether the Constitution may limit jurisdiction to administer
given intangibles to a single state. In Wyman, for example, the
Court did not attempt to choose between the states which might
have administered the property. And in Baker the Court did not
purport to establish an exclusive situs for shares of stock. Indeed,
the Court did not discuss whether the shares could be deemed to
have another situs, but characterized the action as one affecting
"the ownership of shares of stock in a Kentucky corporation
having no situs outside its own State so far as appears ....
Although Woodworth does suggest that several states may have
jurisdiction, the Court has never expressly ruled upon the con-
stitutionality of multiple jurisdiction to administer intangibles. 9
In contrast, the Court has fully considered the constitution-
ality of multiple state jurisdiction to impose death taxes on testa-
mentary transfers of intangible property and to escheat abandoned
intangibles. In the tax cases, the Court has vascillated between
upholding and disallowing multiple taxation. Its present position,
which was first established at the turn of the century, is that the
Constitution does not require that the power to tax intangibles
27. The requirement that the company have an agent for service of
process undoubtedly is no longer significant in view of the decisions in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), which have expanded the scope
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations and insurance companies.
28. 242 U.S. at 400.
29. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), 72 HARv. L. IREv. 695
(1959), 43 Mnix. L. Ruv. 569 (1959), 107 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1958), the
Supreme Court implicitly left open the question of whether multiple adminis-
tration of intangibles was unconstitutional:
In considering restrictions on the power to tax, this Court has con-
cluded that "jurisdiction" over intangible property is not limited to a
single State .... Whether the type of "jurisdiction" with which this
opinion deals may be exercised by more than one State we need not
decide.
Id. at 247. The precise type of jurisdiction to which the Court was referring
is unclear. However, the quoted language appears in that portion of the opin-
ion dealing with in rem jurisdiction and it is reasonable to assume that the
Court meant to leave open the issue of the permissibility of multiple, in rem,
probate jurisdiction over the same intangibles. Compare Buchanan & Myers,
supra note 2, at 944.
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be limited to a single state. In Blackstone v. Miller,30 the Court
held that New York had not violated due process by imposing a
death tax on the testamentary transfer of a New York bank
deposit even though the decedent was a domiciliary of Illinois
and the transfer was also taxed by that state. In 1930, however,
in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,1 the majority con-
cluded that the possibility of several states taxing choses in ac-
tion such as negotiable instruments "suggest a wrong premise."'
The Court overruled Blackstone and held that in general only the
state of domicile could constitutionally impose an inheritance tax
on bonds left by a decedent.33 The Court reasoned that intangible
property is not materially distinct from tangible property and
since the latter could only be taxed by one state, a similar rule
should be applied to the former. The domiciliary state was ac-
corded exclusive power to tax by application of the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam, which locates personal property at
the decedent's domicile. 4 Single state taxation survived only
about a decade. In 1942, in State Tax Comm'r v. Aldrich,5 the
Court restored the Blackstone view and allowed multiple state
30. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
31. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
32. Id. at 210. The Court's holding was the result of a pragmatic ap-
proach to taxation:
The inevitable tendency of that view [Blackstone's] is to disturb good
relations among the States and produce the kind of discontent ex-
pected to subside after establishment of the Union....
Taxation is an intensely practical matter and laws in respect of it
should be construed and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as pos-
sible, unjust and oppressive consequences.
Id. at 209, 212. For a similar approach, see First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284
U.S. 312 (1932) (involving shares of corporate stock).
33. The Court did recognize the possibility of taxation of intangibles by
a state other than the owner's domicile if the property has acquired a taxable
"business" situs elsewhere. See Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U.S. 204, 213 (1930).
34. The maxim appears to have at least two meanings. One definition is
that personal property of the deceased wherever located is subject to the law
of his domicile. Another meaning is that the situs of intangible personal
property is at the owner's domicile. The maxim is applied for various pur-
poses, including jurisdiction to tax and to administer a decedent's estate. See
generally Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 432, 110 P.2d 419 (1941) (maxim
applied to income taxation); Hewit v. Freeman, 221 Ind. 675, 51 N.E.2d 6
(1948); Massey-Harris Co. v. Douglas County, 143 Neb. 547, 10 N.W.2d 346
(1943). For a discussion of the maxim as applied in the tax cases and a
criticism of its use, see Stimson, supra note 4, at 1370-78. Compare Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); In re Estate of Schultz, 180 Kan. 444, 304
P.d 539 (1948).
85. 816 U.S. 174 (1942).
1965]
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taxation of intangibles5 6 In that case Utah levied an inheritance
tax on shares of a Utah corporation left by a decedent who was
domiciled in New York. Although neither the stock certificates
nor the corporation's transfer books were located in Utah, the
Supreme Court upheld the tax. Under the Court's rationale,
power to tax rests with any state which has extended benefits or
protection to the owner or his property and also with any state
which can demonstrate it actually has power over property.
Although no constitutional barriers to multi-state taxation of
intangibles were found, the Court did note: "we believe that a
different system should be designed to protect against multiple
taxation, [but] it is not our province to provide it.""1
The Constitution does, however, prevent multiple jurisdiction
to escheat a single intangible. In Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania,." the Court held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protects the obligor of intangible
property from double liability by limiting escheat of a single
piece of property to one state. Since due process requires that only
one state escheat intangible property, in Texas v. New Jersey,"0
the Supreme Court was faced with determining which state
should be chosen. However, the Constitution does not furnish
guidelines for making this choice and thus the Court's decision-
making process was analogous to that of a common law court.40
Several alternatives for determining which state's claim should
prevail were urged upon the Court: the state with the most sig-
nificant contacts with the debt; the state of the debtor's domicile;
the state of the debtor's principal place of business; the state of
36. See generally Guterman, Revitalization of Multiple Death Taxation,
42 CoLum. L. REv. 1249 (1942); Traynor, State Taxation and the Supreme
Court, 19S8 Term, 28 CALIF. L. Rav. 1 (1939). Prior to Aldrich the Court's
position in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. had been severely eroded in Curry v.
NlcCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
37. 316 U.S. at 181. Most states have enacted reciprocal exemption legis-
lation which curtails multiple taxation of intangibles. See Freedman, Practi-
cal Aspects of Multiple State Taxation of Intangibles of Nonresident Dece-
dents Since the Aldrich Case, 24, NoTRE DAsam LAw. 41 (1948); Comment, 16
HASTINGS L. J. 101, 109 (1964). Cf. UNiFoRm INTERSTATE ARBITRATION OF
DEATH TAXES ACT; U FORm INTERSTATE CowPROIpSAE OF DEATH TAXEs
ACT. With respect to tangible personal property the Supreme Court apparent-
ly permits taxation only by the state of its situs. See Thomas v. Virginia, 364
U.S. 443 (1960), 46 AlifN. L. REV. 393 (1961).
38. 368 U.S. 71 (1961), 50 CALia. L. REV. 735 (1962), 62 CoLn. L. REv.
708 (1962).
39. 85 Sup. Ct. 626 (1965).
40. The case reached the Court through its original jurisdiction over con-
troversies between states. Compare Texas v. Florida, 806 U.S. 398 (1939).
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the creditor's last known address. The last alternative was se-
lected because it "recognizes that the debt was an asset of the
creditor . . . [and] will tend to distribute escheats among the
States in the proportion of the commercial activities of their resi-
dents .... -41 The creditor's last known address, as recorded by
the debtor, was favored over the technically legal domicile be-
cause of its administrative simplicity.4
While estate administration undoubtedly has similarities to
both the tax and escheat areas, it is submitted that the rationale
of the escheat area is particularly applicable to the administration
of intangibles and ought to compel a single state jurisdiction to
administer. In the Western Union Tel. case the Court reasoned
that the obligor of intangible property is denied due process
when he can be compelled by one state to perform the obligation
with no assurance that another state will not also hold him liable
for the same obligation. The obligor of intangible property sub-
ject to multiple administration is also in such a position of poten-
tial double liability. Although the mere fact that a probate court
considers the asset subject to its administration proceedings does
not in itself prejudice the obligor, ultimately several adminis-
trators will seek to enforce the obligation. At this point he is
indistinguishable from the obligor in the escheat area because
both have multiple claimants seeking to compel his perform-
ance.43 And payment to one claimant does not necessarily protect
41. 85 Sup. Ct. at 630.
42. Previously there was division in state authority as to whether a non-
resident's property which is subject to escheat goes to the decedent's domi-
cile or to the state of situs. Compare In re Rapoport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291,
26 N.W.2d 777 (1947) (upholding situs escheat) with In re Nolan's Estate,
135 Cal. App. 2d 16, 286 P.2d 899 (1955) (upholding domiciliary escheat, ir-
respective of situs), and California v. State Tax Comm'n, 55 Wash. 2d 155,
346 P.2d 1006 (1959) (same). See generally Note, 61 CoL-nm. L. REV. 1319
(1961).
43. The estate obligor may be able to interplead all administrators who
claim the property under the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(1958). See, e.g., Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 141 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 739 (1937). Compare Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). See generally Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the
Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940); Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage
of Federal Interpleader, 56 ElAnv. L. Ruv. 541, 929 (1943). This remedy may
not be available to the person holding escheatable property. See Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937) whch held that the eleventh
amendment forecloses use of the interpleader statute as a means of forcing
two states into the same court. In addition, since the Constitution gives the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in controversies between states, arguably
the federal district courts could not take interpleader jurisdiction where the
claimants are two states. Despite the fact that interpleader may be available
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the obligor from another's claim.4 In addition, application of the
rationale of the escheat cases to require single state administra-
tion of each intangible arguably is not precluded by the related
tax cases which permit multiple taxation of the same intangible.
The tax cases can be distinguished on the ground that multiple
taxation involves the taking by two or more states of only a
portion of the intangible asset rather than an attempt by each
state to assume control of the entire property, as in administra-
tion and escheat.
45
If due process were to require single state administration of
each intangible, the Supreme Court ultimately would have to
choose an exclusive situs for each intangible. The Court might
simply adopt the rules presently followed by the majority of
states in locating various types of intangible property.0 On the
other hand, it might follow the approach taken in Texas v. New
Jersey and make an independent judgment as to the state in
which a particular intangible should be deemed to have its situs.
B. THE PossIBHITY OF A SINGLE SITUS oR ALL INTANGIBLES
Even the conclusion that multiple administration of an in-
tangible is unconstitutional and a determination of the proper
situs of a particular intangible would not diminish the incidence
of ancillary administration. However, the Supreme Court could
follow up a decision that multiple administration of an intangible
violates due process with a determination that all intangibles
to the estate obligor, this does not necessarily place him in a better position
than the escheat obligor since there are limitations on the efficacy of inter-
pleader. Under the statute, the amount in controversy must be over $500,
and the claimants must be of diverse citizenship. It is unclear whether the
remedy is available where the obligor disputes the amount or existence of his
liability. See HART & WECHSLER, THE F FanAL CouRTs AND THm FEDFA
SysTsm 924-25 (1953). But cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shawver, 208 F. Supp.
464 .(WD. Mo. 1962).
44. Payment to one adminstrator does not automatically bar the claim of
an administrator appointed by another state because of the traditional theory
that the two administrators are not in privity with each other. See Comment,
55 MAicH. L. Rnv. 261 (1956). While some states have developed rules which
protect an estate obligor from double liability the extent of their protection
varies. For a discussion of these rules see Hopkins, supra note 4, at 485-40,
44549, 620-24, 628-34. If the estate obligor knew he could pay an adminis-
trator without risk of double liability, voluntary payment would be promoted.
45. Multiple taxation that exceeds 100% of the estate can be prevented by
the exercise of original jurisdiction in a suit between the states. Cf. Texas
v. Florida, 806 U.S. S98 (1939).
46. See cases and authorities cited notes 5-8 supra and accompanying
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should be administered in a single state. If all intangible property
were deemed to have a situs in one state, the property would be
treated as the decedent had treated it -as a unit.4 7 It is sub-
mitted that as a logical matter the decedent's domicile should
be that state. Not only is domiciliary administration usually re-
garded as the primary proceeding, but domiciliary law is general-
ly applied to determine succession to personal property. s In most
instances, the domicile has had more sustained contacts than
any other state with the decedent and probably with his intangi-
ble property. Exclusive probate at the domicile not only would
channel the proceedings to the forum whose law governs, but
also would be a movement in the direction of unitary administra-
tion of all the decedent's assets. Such a result would effect a
greater "ease of administration," a factor that the Supreme Court
relied on as a basis for choosing one state over another in the
context of escheat.49
Conceptually, intangible property could readily be deemed to
have its situs at the decedent's domicile. Such property is really
the right of the deceased obligee to compel performance of an
obligation running to him. It is an asset that is identified with the
owner, and under the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, it
could be deemed to have a situs at the owner's domicile upon his
death. Although one recent case disparaged the idea that the
maxim could be used to locate intangible property at the dece-
dent's domicile,50 the Supreme Court's most recent consideration
of the maxim indicates it may have some vitality.51
Although persuasive reasons exist for limiting administration
of all intangibles to the decedent's domicile, a 1958 Supreme
Court decision, Hanson v. Denokla,2 may not permit such a rule.
47. The various uniform acts in the area of probate attempt to foster the
policy of treating the estate as a unit. See Atkinson, The Uniform Ancillary
Administration and Probate Acts, 67 H1Anv. L. Ruv. 619 (1954).
48. See cases and authorities cited notes 17 & 18 supra.
49. Texas v. New Jersey, 85 Sup. Ct. 626, 631 (1965).
50. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249 (1958); cf. Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
51. In Texas v. New Jersey the Court explicitly recognized that the rule
it adopted limiting escheat to the state of the creditor's last known address
was simply a variation on this maxim, 85 Sup. Ct. at 630 n.10.
52. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). That case involved a dispute between the ap-
pointees under an inter vivos appointment and the residuary legatees under
the will of the settlor who exercised the power. While domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania the settlor executed a deed of trust in which she retained a power of
appointment over the corpus. The trust assets were corporate securities held
by Delaware trustees. The settlor later became domiciled in Florida and
exercised the power there on the same day she executed her will, which was
1965]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:129
Therein, the Court stated: "The settlor-decedent's Florida domi-
cile is equally unavailing as a basis for jurisdiction over the trust
assets .... The fact that the owner is or was domiciled within the
forum State is not a sufficient affiliation with the property upon
which to base jurisdiction in 'em.'53 This broad language might
be construed to foreclose the possibility of a decedent's domicile
exercising exclusive jurisdiction over his intangible property.
However, it is possible to confine this language to cases involving
inter vivos dispositions of property since Hanson involved an
action to determine the validity of an inter vivos exercise of a
power of appointment over an inter vivos trust. Indeed, other
language in the opinion intimates that the Court left open the
question of whether a state could exercise in rem probate jurisdic-
tion over intangible property of a deceased domiciliary. The
Court stated:
Whatever the efficacy of a so-called "in rem" jurisdiction over assets
ad7ittedly passing under a local will, a State acquires no in rem juris-
diction to adjudicate the validity of inter-vivos dispositions simply
because its decision might augment an estate passing under a will
probated in its courts. 54
Moreover, the arguments in favor of domiciliary jurisdiction
probably were not fully considered by the Court because both
parties assumed that the intangibles in question had their situs
in Delaware 5 and failed to argue that jurisdiction over intangi-
bles could be approached in terms other than the traditional
situs.56 That was also the situation in the related Supreme Court
subsequently probated in Florida. A declaratory judgment proceeding was
instituted in a Florida court by the testamentary beneficiaries to determine
whether the trust assets passed by virtue of the appointment or were part of
the estate subject to probate. The Delaware trustees and some of the ap-
pointees were not personally served, and did not appear, but the Florida
Supreme Court ruled it had jurisdiction over the absent defendants and held
the exercise invalid. One of the issues before the Supreme Court was whether
Florida had jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the appointment. The
Court held Florida had neither in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets nor
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees.
53. Id. at 249.
54. Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.)
55. Id. at 247.
56. A recent Kansas statute attempted to grant jurisdiction to the pro-
bate courts of that state over all intangible assets of resident decedents. Kan-
sas was one of the few states which declined jurisdiction over nonresident
decedent's personal property in favor of the domiciliary state. See In re Miller's
Estate, 90 Kan. 819, 136 Pac. 255 (1913); cf. In re Plasterer's Estate, 49 Wash.
2d 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956). The purpose of the statute was to force other
states, and particularly Missouri, to decline jurisdiction over intangible assets
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decision in Riley v. New York Trust Co.5
Thus, attainment of unitary administration of a decedent's
intangibles by judicial fiat is theoretically possible. Further, it
can be made consistent with the interests of the parties interested
in such proceedings. Of course, administration of intangibles at
the decedent's domicile would be palatable only if the interests
of nondomiciliary tax authorities, creditors, and beneficiaries are
satisfied. Tax claims of states other than the domicile might still
be enforced even if those states were precluded from administer-
ing by a determination that the situs of all intangibles is at the
decedent's domicile for purposes of administration. Arguably, an
intangible could be deemed to have its situs in a state for pur-
poses of jurisdiction to tax even though the situs for administra-
tion is elsewhere. In this situation a tax proceeding could be held
in that state without a full ancillary administration. Alternative-
ly, the tax claim itself well might be enforced in the state of
administration. 8
of Kansas decedents. See Baker, In the Administration of Intangibles: Mis-
souri's Section 466.010 in Perspective, 19 Mo. L. REv. 1, 42 (1954). The
Kansas Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, In re Estate of
DeLano, 181 Kan. 729, 315 P.2d 611 (1957), 6 KAw. L. R V. 439 (1958), on
the ground that it was an attempt to give extraterritorial effect to Kansas
policy. The court pointed out that Kansas could not obtain jurisdiction over
those intangibles with which it had no connection and added that there was
no way to enforce the statute unless Kansas administrators went on midnight
junkets into other states to collect assets of Kansas decedents. Rather than
determining whether Kansas could constitutionally be considered the situs for
a domiciliary's intangible property, the court simply assumed the situs was
elsewhere. The decision was not appealed.
57. 315 U.S. 343 (1942). In that case representatives of the decedent
appointed in Georgia and New York both sought to have the obligor turn
the property over to them. The obligor, a Delaware corporation, interpleaded
the two claimants in a Delaware court. The decedent's will was probated in
Georgia where it was held it was the domicile. However, a special adminis-
trator appointed in New York claimed that New York was the domicile. The
Delaware court refused to give credit to Georgia's determination of domicile
and held that New York was the domicile. The Supreme Court held that
Delaware was not required to give full faith and credit to the Georgia judg-
ment since that judgment could not operate in rem upon stock which had its
situs in Delaware. Nonetheless, -the case does not stand for the proposition
that the assets could not be deemed to have a situs at the decedent's domicile.
The Court did not reach that question since the parties stipulated, and the
Court assumed, that the stock had its situs in Delaware.
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917), could be explained on
the same basis since the Court there simply assumed its conclusion that the
stock had its situs in the state of incorporation rather than at the decedent's
domicile. Id. at 400.
58. Although full faith and credit has been construed not to require a
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As far as nondomiciliary creditors are concerned, unitary ad-
ministration generally would be a more equitable manner of
satisfying debts of the estate. The burden is slight because those
creditors who can find no property of the decedent within their
state have always been required to seek out the forum where
there are estate assets. Moreover, with respect to the decedent's
intangible property, unitary domiciliary administration would
prevent one creditor from securing satisfaction of his debt while
another goes unpaid. To the same extent it also would curtail
forum shopping by creditors whose claims have been disallowed
in one jurisdiction but who are still able to seek payment out of
assets in another state. 9
The position of prospective takers of the decedent's property
by will or intestacy is essentially unchanged by domiciliary ad-
ministration of all intangibles. It means only that they must go
to the domicile if they wish to contest the disposition of intangi-
ble property. Absent their personal appearance, a determination
of the domiciliary probate court as to succession to intangibles
would not prevent them from litigating any issue with respect to
real or tangible personal property in another forum. 0 Because
domiciliary administration of intangibles would merely limit
the jurisdiction in which persons interested in the estate can
present claims to or against intangible property it does not
seem harsh when weighed against the delay and expense con-
comitant with ancillary administration of each intangible in a
different situs state.61
state to entertain tax claims, many jurisdictions presently will entertain such
claims. See Comment, 16 HASTINGS L. J. 101 (1964); 46 MiNu. L. REv. 893,
400-01 (1961). Furthermore many states by reciprocal legislation will not im-
pose a death tax on the intangibles of a nonresident. See note 37 supra.
59. See generally Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Creditors" Rights in De-
cedents' Estates, 42 IowA L. REv. 341 (1957); Comment, 1958 WIs. L. REV.
451, 481; cf. Nadelmann, Insolvent Decedents' Estates, 49 Mion. L. REv.
1129 (1951).
60. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Riley v. New York
Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). Of course a probate decree based upon in
personam jurisdiction over persons who have contested issues before the
court rendering the decree would be conclusive, as to those parties, in the
second state. See Hanson v. Denckla, supra; Loewenthal v. Mandell, 125 Fla.
685, 170 So. 169 (1936); In re Kane's Estate, 3 App. Div. 2d 337, 160 N.Y.S.
2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See generally Hopkins, The Extraterritorial Effect of
Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221 (1944); Simes, The Administration of De-
cedent's Estate as a Proceeding In Rem, 43 MicH. L. Rzv. 675, 699 (1945).
61. For an article concluding that unitary administration of intangibles is
not desirable, see Buchanan & Myers, The Administration of Intangibles in
View of First National Bank v. Maine, 48 HAMv. L. REV. 911, 950-53 (1935).
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Notwithstanding the policies favoring determination that the
decedent's domicile is the sole situs for all intangibles and the
absence of any judicial authority directly contrary to this result,
attainment of such a goal faces serious obstacles. As noted above,
a determination that multiple administration of an intangible
violates due process does not lead inexorably to the establishment
of a single situs for all intangibles. To hold the decedent's domicile
the situs of all intangibles would require upsetting a great body
of law as to the situs of various intangibles 2 Further, conflict
would not cease even if the decedent's domicile were accorded
exclusive jurisdiction to administer. Since each state might read-
ily persuade itself that it was the domicile, conflicts over that
issue would replace conflicts over situs. In order to effectively
limit administration to the domicile, domicile itself would have to
acquire a federal constituional meaning.!' Arguably, there is no
impediment to the Supreme Court enunciating a federal stand-
ard. If due process were to require that only the domicile be
allowed to administer intangibles, then domicile itself could well
be deemed a federal question, at least for purposes of determining
jurisdiction to administer. Alternatively, the full faith and credit
clause might be interpreted in such a manner that Congress could
provide a federal legislative standard for domicile. Since that
clause gives Congress power to prescribe the manner of proving,
and the "effect" of judicial proceedings in each state, arguably it
would be permissible for that body to determine that when facts
A, B, and C have been proven, the "effect" shall be to conclusive-
ly establish domicile 4 Adoption of this approach would, how-
ever, greatly increase the judicial load of the Supreme Court as
final arbiter of domicile.
Finally, even if a single state were designated for administra-
tion of all of a decedent's intangible property, unitary administra-
tion of the entire estate would still be thwarted to the extent that
62. See notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text.
63. At present an adjudication of domicile in one state is not entitled to
full faith and credit in another state as to property in the second state. See
liley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Baker v. Baker, Eccles
& Co., 242 U.S. 894 (1917); Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350 (1900). See
also Annot., 121 AL.R. 1200 (1939). It would appear that domicile has already
been accorded a degree of federal constitutional status for jurisdiction in
some areas. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). For alternative solutions, see Knapp, Solutione
of the Double Domicile Problem, 15 CoNtr. B. J. 251 (1941); 56 ELAnv. L.
REv. 482 (1942).
64. See Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAm. L. REV.
581, 585 (1953).
1965]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:129
the decedent's real and tangible personal property has its situs
elsewhere. Although not inconceivable, radical changes in the
existing law would be required to subject such property to the
'exclusive jurisdiction of the domicile.
CONCLUSION
The present concept of in rem probate jurisdiction under which
states may arbitrarily assign a situs to intangible property is
inadequate insofar as it permits or facilitates multiple administra-
tion of the same intangible, and insofar as it requires ancillary ad-
ministration in each situs state. Confronted with the proper case,
a court should hold that multiple administration of the same in-
tangible violates due-process because of the potential prejudice to
its obligor. Having decided this, the court eventually must estab-
lish a situs for each type of intangible. This would eliminate the
existing possibility of multiple claims to administer the same
intangible property. However, in order to facilitate efficient and
economical estate administration the court could go further and
achieve unitary administration by establishing the decedent's
domicile as the exclusive situs of all intangibles. The likelihood of
attainment of such a result by judicial fiat is greatly diminished
by the existing body of law which places the situs of specific
intangibles in states other than the domicile. Nonetheless there is
no express judicial precedent to prevent this result and in balance
the scheme would probably result in a better method of probate
administration without unduly injuring existing interests in ancil-
lary proceedings.
